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LEGISLATURE PROVIDES FOR "P.O.D." CERTIFICATES
OF DEPOSIT
In the Matter of Estate of Atkinson
175 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961)
Testator left three sums of money on deposit in a savings bank in an
attempt to exclude his wife from her statutory share of his estate. For the
deposits he took three certificates of deposit. The certificates recited the
deceased depositor's name followed by "P.O.D.," an abbreviated form of
"payable on death," and the names of the decedent's daughters by a former
marriage.1 The widow elected to take against the will. She filed exceptions
to the inventory and appraisement of the estate contending that the bank
deposits should have been included. The daughters argued that the certifi-
cates of deposit passed to them upon the depositor's death by virtue of the
"payable on death" language. They insisted that there is no difference
between "P.O.D." certificates and joint and survivorship bank accounts
in the names of A or B or the survivor of them.2 The court sustained the
widow's objections and held that testator's certificates were an invalid
attempt at a testamentary distribution. 3
The joint and survivorship bank account is well established in Ohio.
However, these contracts have been found valid only when there existed a
presently vested interest in both co-depositors. 4 The court in the instant
case was unable to find a present interest in the daughters, because they had
no right to the money until testator's death. It found support for this
position in decisions from other jurisdictions which have dealt with certifi-
cates of deposit.5
As an alternative to the joint and survivorship bank account analogy,
counsel for the daughters might have advanced a different theory in sup-
port of their contention. It could be argued that by use of the certificate
phraseology and in light of surrounding circumstances, testator intended to
1 In the Matter of Estate of Atkinson, 175 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio P. Ct. 1961). The pur-
pose of excluding the wife was clearly expressed in the will.
2 See Alexander, "Joint and Survivorship Property," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 75 (1959).
3 In the Matter of Estate of Atkinson, supra note 1, at 550. The court commented:
"It is clear in the present matter that there was no present interest of any
kind created in the decedent's daughters by the language used in the certificate
of deposit. On the contrary, the words 'payable on death' are clearly testa-
mentary."
The court concluded that this was contrary to the Statute of Wills, Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2107.03 (1961).
4 Ohio Rev. Code § 1105.09 (1953). Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E.
838 (1935); In re Estate of Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929); Cleve-
land Trust Co. v. Scobie, Adm'r, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); Schmitt v.
Schmitt, 39 Ohio App. 219, 177 N.E. 478 (1928); Waltbillig v. Burke, 17 Ohio App. 444
(1923); In re Estate of Krakoff, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 387, 179 N.E.2d 566 (C.P. 1961).
5 Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 648 (1930); McGillivray v. First Nat.
Bank, 56 N.D. 152, 217 N.W. 150 (1927).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
create a "Totten" or tentative trust. This trust device has been recognized
by the Restatement of Trusts0 and has been adopted in twelve jurisdictions.7
The "Totten" trust, first established in New York,8 is created by the deposit
of money in the depositor's own name as trustee for another. It is a tenta-
tive trust revocable at any time during its existence. The beneficiary has no
control over the deposit until the death of the depositor. If the depositor
dies before the beneficiary, without having revoked the trust, the pre-
sumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand
at the death of the depositor.9
The position of the "Totten" trust in Ohio law at the time of Atkinson's
deposits was highly uncertain. In one case there is indication that although
the court did not recognize the Totten trust by that name, it may have
done so in substance.' 0 The Ohio legislature in the 1961 session placed its
sanction upon this type of trust with respect to deposits in a building and
loan association, having done so earlier for deposits in a bank.'"
It seems that counsel's biggest task in the Atkinson case would be that
of showing the requisite intent on the part of the depositor to create a trust.
The standard phraseology "as trustee for" or "in trust for" is not present.
Yet even in the absence of these words, the court may find from surround-
ing circumstances an intent to create a trust.12 One court construing the
term "P.O.D.," found no presumption of intention to create a trust was
raised by the term "P.O.D." alone.' 3
6 Restatement (Second), Trusts § 58 (1959).
7 Peppercorn, "Totten Trusts in Kansas," 9 Kan. L. Rev. 51 (1960).
8 Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 124, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904).
9 Id. See also Restatement (Second), Trusts § 58 (1959); 7 Am. Jur. Banks § 438
(1947).
10 Jones v. Luplow, 13 Ohio App. 428 (1920). The settlor deposited money in a
savings account with herself as trustee for another. The court held that even though
the depositor retained the pass book and made withdrawals from the account, the trust
was valid and upon her death the beneficiary took. There is, however, some question
as to whether the court recognized the settlor's right to revoke the trust, a necessary
ingredient for a tentative trust. The opinion refers to the withdrawal of funds as not
being a revocation because the settlor had reserved no such right. Nevertheless, the
trust device in this case manifests several characteristics of the "Totten" trust.
11 Ohio Rev. Code § 1151.191 (1961). See also Ohio Rev. Code § 1105.10 (1953)
which authorizes deposits of money in a bank in trust for someone else.
12 Bierau v. Bohemian Bldg. Loan & Savings Assoc., 205 Md. 456, 109 A.2d 120
(1954) ; Bogert, Trusts 47 (1952); Scott, Abridgement of the Law of Trusts § 58.1
(1960).
13 Note Ohio Rev. Code § 1105.10 (1953), which authorizes the trust deposit for
banks. See also Bank of Perryville v. Kutz, 276 S.V.2d 593 (Mo. App. 1955). In this Mis-
souri case a depositor had placed upon his record of deposits "Payable on death to Tony
Kohlfeld." This was held not to create a trust because no extrinsic facts showed
depositor's intent to create an interest in the beneficiary nor that he considered himself
or the bank as trustee to hold title for the beneficiary. The fact that the court was
particularly concerned with finding extrinsic facts to support a trust intention indicates
that "P.O.D." in and of itself is not a sufficient demonstration of the requisite intent.
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The Ohio General Assembly in the 1961 session has provided an op-
portunity for depositors to do exactly what the probate court denied Atkin-
son the right- to do. 14 Notwithstanding the Ohio Statute of Wills,15 deposi-
tors may enter into written contracts with savings institutions authorizing
deposits payable on death. The statute specifically sanctions use of "P.O.D."
as an abbreviation for "payable on death." The interest of the beneficiary
will not vest until the death of the depositor. The legislature has established
the contract principle that defense counsel argued for in the Atkinson case.
This new section differs from the one cited above establishing limited use
of the "Totten" trust in that it mentions only use of a written contract
which avoids the adoption of a trust theory.' 6 Furthermore, this contract
right extends to all authorized depository institutions whereas the new
"Totten" trust section is narrow in scope, dealing only with building and
loan associations. 17
As a result of these new Ohio Revised Code sections, there exists con-
siderably more testamentary flexibility in Ohio. Many people not wishing
to go to the expense of having a will drafted may provide for the disposition
of a substantial part of their estates by virtue of a contract with a savings
institution. By embodying the essential ingredients of the "Totten" trust
in the new Revised Code sections, the legislature has enabled a depositor to
change allocations to beneficiaries of the bank account whereas a testator
may not shuffle the distributions to legatees without being subjected to the
formality and expense of redrafting a will.' 8 There is, however, no apparent
beneficial tax treatment to be gained through use of the new Revised Code
sections.19
14 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2130.10, 2131.11 (1961).
15 Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.03 (1953).
16 Supra note 14.
17 Supra note 10.
18 In this regard see the "pour over" statute passed by the Ohio Legislature in
1961, Ohio Rev. Code § 2107.63 (1961).
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 5731.02 (1953).
